This paper presents a framework for understanding the limits that exist in optimal policy design in dynamic contexts. We consider the design of policies in the context of dynamic linear models. Fundamental design limits exist for policy rules in such environments in the sense that any policy rule embodies tradeoffs between the magnitudes of different frequency-specific components of the variance. Hence policies that are effective in eliminating low frequency variance components of a state variable can only do so at the cost of exacerbating high frequency variance components, and vice versa. Examples of the implications of such tradeoffs are considered.
Introduction
This paper studies a number of issues related to the design of optimal policies in dynamic contexts. Issues of policy design have experienced a renaissance in macroeconomics over the last decade, driven to a significant extent by the modern literature on monetary policy rules, a literature that was to an important extent initiated by Taylor (1993) ; Taylor (1999) contains a wide range of applications. An important feature of the work on Taylor-type monetary policy rules is the importance that has been assigned in this literature to understanding how the evaluation of alternative policy rules involves assessing tradeoffs between various objectives, such as minimizing inflation, interest rates, and output volatility.
The analysis in this paper adds to this previous work on policy analysis by developing a theory of design limits to optimal policy. Specifically, we model the effects of alternative control rules on a state variable in the frequency domain. A frequency domain approach allows one to identify the frequency-specific components of the overall variance of the state variable.
1 Our analysis then identifies the ways in which different control rules affect the contributions of fluctuations at each frequency to the overall variance. This approach allows us to develop an explicit characterization of the tradeoffs that exist between diminishing the variance contribution of one frequency and another.
Examples of these tradeoffs in the control theory literature are the Bode and Poisson integral constraints; despite their importance in understanding the development of optimal policy, these types of constraints do not appear to have been previously exploited in the economics literature. The sorts of abstract arguments we develop have natural implications for contexts such as monetary policy design. Monetary policy rules are typically evaluated in terms of their ability to minimize fluctuations in state variables such as output and inflation.
In this context, the design limits we develop imply that policy rules that are efficacious in reducing low (high) frequency fluctuations in output and inflation will inevitably exacerbate the magnitude of high (low) frequency fluctuations, in a way that we make precise. These tradeoffs do not, of course, by themselves imply any particular ordering concerning the relative desirability of different policy rules. Rather, these tradeoffs imply that any ordering must carefully account for how the policymaker assesses the frequency-specific components of fluctuations for the outcomes of interest.
The design limits we describe are model-specific in the sense that a particular model produces a particular characterization of the frequency-specific tradeoffs that exist in stabilizing the state variable the policymaker wishes to control. In other words, different models imply different constraints on what a policymaker can achieve. As such, these limits are an important complement to work on policy design in the presence of model uncertainty 2 . Concerns over model uncertainty have motivated much recent research on the theoretical foundations of policy analysis; one example is the research program on robust policy construction initiated by Hansen and Sargent (2001 ,2002 . This work focuses on local model uncertainty, i.e. model uncertainty that is local to a given baseline model. The interactions of policy design and model uncertainty in cases where model uncertainty is "global" in the sense that the space of potential models contains very different elements is explored in Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) . That paper uses an explicit decision-theoretic formulation which treats the true model as an unknown variable and computes expected policy effects by "integrating out" the variable. An important next step in studying policy design is the integration of the limits we describe here into environments with global model uncertainty; some initial discussion along these lines is found in .
Our goal in this paper is to focus on basic ideas rather than formalism. Much of the work described here represents research in progress and we have felt free to be relatively speculative. Our hope is that the ideas we outline will stimulate others to pursue what we believe is an extremely promising research program.
Design limits in linear systems: basic ideas
This section considers the construction of optimal policies for systems with a scalar state variable t x and a scalar control ; such systems are known as Single Input
Single Output or SISO systems. In our analysis, we assume that a policymaker wishes to minimize the unconditional variance of the state,
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The law of motion for the state is
where t ξ represents an unobserved zero mean random variable with associated Wold
The innovations t ν are assumed to have a common variance 2 t Eν ; it is not necessary for our analysis that the error variances are constant. We focus on feedback rules for the control, i.e. rules of the form
Given rules of the form (4), the law of motion (1) may be rewritten so that
if is invertible, which we will assume. 
Equation (6) is known in the control literature as the free dynamics of the system. In light of the loss function (1), one may interpret the optimal policy problem as identifying that choice of feedback rule that maximizes the difference between the variance of 
(8) may be rewritten as
In control theory, ( ) S ω is known as the sensitivity function (cf. Kwakernaak and Sivan (1972) , pg. 487). Equation (10) 
A discrete time version of this constraint is due to Wu and Jonckheere, (1992) . In order to state this constraint, it is necessary to introduce the function ( )
By the fundamental theorem of algebra, this function may be factored into simple polynomials, therefore
where the constant c is determined by the requirement that the system defined by (1) to (4) 
Theorem. Discrete Time Bode Constraint
Assume that the controlled system is globally asymptotically stable and that 1 ν ≥ . Then, there exists a non negative constant such that
Pf. Wu and Jonckheere (1992) . (7) this implies that it is impossible to design a policy such that
with strict inequality at some positive measure of frequencies. 4 In order to achieve (2) and (5), may be invertible even if
is reasonable to regard as a leading case since for many macroeconomic models, the stationarity or nonstationary of state variables is not determined by the presence of a feedback rule. 
The first order necessary condition for this problem implies that for each frequency ω the optimal ( )
Eq. (15), in turn implies that the Fourier transform of the optimal feedback rule ( )
which in turn implies that the optimal feedback rule is
The optimal policy rule has a simple interpretation. Eq. (13) optimal policy design as a policymaker will need to pay particular attention to the implications of a policy for those models where as such models imply that the cost of reducing variance at certain frequencies will be particularly high in the sense of creating especially large increases in variance at other frequencies.
Applications
In this section we apply the basic ideas associated with optimal policy design in the presence of the Bode integral constraint to illustrate some of the insights that may be produced by this framework.
i. tradeoffs between low and high frequency fluctuations
Suppose that a policymaker wishes to design a policy that works well when
ω has the typical "Granger" spectral shape (Granger (1966 ), Sargent (1987 
Following eq. (10), such a policy means that the variance contribution of the frequencies
How will such a policy perform in light of the Bode integral constraint? We focus on the case . The sort of strategy described by (18) provides good control with respect to those frequencies that contribute the most power to
Ex under the assumption of the typical Granger spectral shape. However, this property comes at a price in the sense that it trades off good performance at low frequencies for poor performance at high frequencies.
The magnitude of the potential cost may be given a lower bound. If 0
then by the Bode integral formula, 
Equation (21) Brock and Durlauf (2003) provide an analysis of local robustness for the system we have described in Section 2. We summarize their basic argument. Suppose that there exists model uncertainty with respect to the temporal structure of the innovations, t ξ .
We do this by introducing uncertainty about the spectral density ( ) f ξ ω . Specifically, relative to a baseline ( ) f ξ ω , the true spectral density lies in the set defined by Combining this with eq. (16), which describes the policymaker's feedback rule at the baseline spectral density, show that the least favorable spectral density must fulfill
Eq. (24) means that the least favorable model with respect to the baseline has the property that the difference between the baseline and the least favorable model is smaller when the baseline spectral density is relatively larger; conversely, the differences between the baseline and the least favorable model are larger when the baseline spectral density is relatively small. The intuition from this finding is driven by the logic of the optimal policy problem as affected by the Bode constraint. Those frequencies against which the 5 This is an indirect way of saying the ratio of the costs in changing ( )
in (24) From the perspective of design limits, the question is how a policy which fulfills (26) performs relative to the last two terms in (27) . Under the assumption that the system is stable for all lag structures in (so that 
iv. measurement error
The theory of design limits may also be applied to study how to design good To see how design limits apply to measurement error, suppose that the true state variable t x obeys the process described by eq. (2) 
where is measurement error. Control equations can of course only be constructed as functions of observables so the control takes the form
To understand how measurement error affects the choice of control rule, we assume that t ξ is zero. 6 In this case, the variance of the state is 6 One might object that if ( ) [ ] 0 ,
, there is no control problem that needs to be addressed. Our purpose in this assumption is to highlight an implication of measurement error, not to provide a realistic stabilization problem. 
v. non-time separable preferences
The frequency domain perspective on policy limits provides some interesting insights into the design of optimal policies in the presence of non-time separable preferences (NTS). As argued in recent work such as Otrok (2001) These alternative preference structures illustrate that the difference between the payoffs under time separable and non-separable cases is determined by the difference between and . From eq. (7), it is immediately the case that = may be expressed as To see how non-time separable preferences affect optimal policy, we consider the special case where and
f ξ ω π = ; we also normalize so that . For this case, the optimal feedback rule takes the form
where the coefficient ( ) F δ reflects the dependence of the feedback parameter on δ . To understand this dependence, (25) implies that for each choice of the feedback parameter In order to solve for ( ) F δ , we proceed as follows. The second integral in (38) may, using a formula in Gradshteyn and Ryzhik (2000, formula 2.554(2) , pg. 169) be rewritten as 
To understand the intuition behind this formula, consider a feedback rule such that ( )
When t ξ is uncorrelated, this rule implies that all correlation in
eliminated by the feedback rule. Following the analysis of (17), this means the rule is optimal.
Multivariate systems
Our discussion thus far has focused on SISO models. There is also a rich literature on multiple input multiple output (MIMO) systems that is of particular importance in contexts where the policymaker wishes to control several state variables, as occurs for a monetary authority who cares about output and inflation volatility. The theory of design limit for MIMO systems is relatively less developed than for SISO systems; important contributions include Chen (1995) and Chen and Nett (1995) . We consider the case where there are two states and one control.
We consider a system for two state variables 1,t x and 2,t x . The equations for these states are 
where I is the identity matrix.
We have been unable to uncover an explicit formula for the Bode integral constraint for multivariate discrete time systems that represents a direct generalization of (13), although there are a number of results available that consider design limits in such systems (cf. Chen and Nett (1993,1995) and Chen (1995) ). We conjecture that the multivariate analog of the sensitivity formula is ( ) 
These roots correspond to the unstable eigenvalues of the matrix . While we are in the process of attempting to develop a proof of (47), we emphasize that we have not done so.
A 7 At the same time, the arguments we make below can be readily modified if we turn out to be incorrect in this conjecture and so we proceed on the basis that (47) holds in order to illustrate the design limits ideas.
In order to see how (47) constrains the design of policy, we employ the relationship ( 
This expression is more complicated than (18) because we are now working with a sensitivity matrix function. If one combines (47) and (50),
This bound indicates how the basic principles we have described for univariate systems apply to multivariate systems, namely, reduction of variance associated with low frequencies can produce high variance contributions from high frequencies. In principle, it should be possible to obtain tighter bounds on the effect of strategy (50) on the magnification of high frequency components using methods such as those developed in Zhou, Doyle, and Glover (1998, chapter 6); we leave this to future work.
While the basic principles of design limits extend naturally from SISO to MIMO systems, there are interesting differences because design limits apply to frequencyspecific components of variance both within and across the state variables. Put differently, in the SISO case, design limits always expose a policymaker to undesirable effects outside the range of frequencies which are targeted by the policymaker. In the MIMO case these undesirable effects themselves will embody tradeoffs with respect to the different state variables. This issue is well exposited in Skogestad and Postlethwaite (1996, chapter 6). 
Summary and conclusions
This paper has attempted to outline some basic issues that arise in the design of optimal policies in dynamic economic systems. Borrowing ideas from the control engineering literature, it is possible to precisely delineate the limitations that a policymaker faces in designing feedback policies. These limits, which are summarized by a remarkable formula known as the Bode integral constraint, illustrate how any 9 There are also important technical differences between SISO and MIMO systems. Hara and Sung (1989, pg. 890) ). Second, both the locations of unstable poles and zeros as well as their directions affect the constraints in MIMO systems (Hara and Sung (1989, pg. 890) ). Similar differences are discussed in Chen (1995) and Chen and Nett (1993, 1995) .
feedback policy is forced to make tradeoffs among the frequency-specific components of the state variables that a policymaker wishes to stabilize. We have suggested how these tools can elucidate policy design issues that arise in the presence of local and global model uncertainty as well as in the face of measurement error. These applications represent only a hint of the potential of these methods for understanding policy design in macroeconomics and other areas of economics.
